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Abstract Cooperative behaviors are common in humans and are fun-
damental to our society. Theoretical and experimental studies have mod-
eled environments in which the behaviors of humans, or agents, have been
restricted to analyze their social behavior. However, it is important that
such studies are generalized to less restrictive environments to understand
human society. Social network games (SNGs) provide a particularly pow-
erful tool for the quantitative study of human behavior. In SNGs, nu-
merous players can behave more freely than in the environments used in
previous studies; moreover, their relationships include apparent conflicts
of interest and every action can be recorded. We focused on recipro-
cal altruism, one of the mechanisms that generate cooperative behavior.
This study aims to investigate cooperative behavior based on reciprocal
altruism in a less restrictive environment. For this purpose, we analyzed
the social behavior underlying such cooperative behavior in an SNG. We
focused on a game scenario in which the relationship between the players
was similar to that in the Leader game. We defined cooperative behav-
iors by constructing a payoff matrix in the scenario. The results showed
that players maintained cooperative behavior based on reciprocal altru-
ism, and cooperators received more advantages than noncooperators. We
found that players constructed reciprocal relationships based on two types
of interactions, cooperative behavior and unproductive communication.
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§1 Introduction
Cooperative behaviors are common in humans, and they are fundamen-
tal to our society9, 24). However, noncooperators obtain more advantages than
cooperators during interactions, because cooperators tend to be exploited by
noncooperators2); thus, natural selection should favor noncooperators. Never-
theless, humans cooperate with each other; therefore, they must have acquired
mechanisms that ensure cooperation during the evolutionary process4).
Since cooperators tend to be exploited by noncooperators, these evolu-
tionary dynamics require structured interactions in which cooperators interact
more frequently with cooperators and noncooperators interact more frequently
with noncooperators. Thus, humans must have acquired mechanisms for assort-
ment between cooperators and noncooperators during the evolutionary process.
Five theoretical mechanisms have been proposed17): kin selection, direct reci-
procity, indirect reciprocity, spatial selection, and multilevel selection. Theoret-
ical and experimental studies have presented evidence of these mechanisms21).
Evidence has been acquired using modeled environments with constrained behav-
iors of humans, or agents, to analyze their social behavior explicitly. However, it
is important that this evidence be generalized to a less restrictive environment
to understand human society21).
Interactive online games are particularly powerful tools for the quantita-
tive study of human society6, 3, 26, 25, 27). In online games, numerous players can
behave more freely than is possible in the environments used in the theoretical
and experimental studies 17, 21), i.e., they do not need to select from a sequence of
several alternatives, because they always have multiple alternatives. In addition,
the actions of all players can be recorded. In the present study, we analyzed a
social network game (SNG), such as Rage of Bahamut,∗1 or Girl Friend BETA,∗2
to understand cooperative behavior among humans, because the following fea-
tures of SNGs provide easier analysis of cooperative behavior. SNGs allow real
players to cooperate and compete with others in situations when the player’s
benefit is represented by a quantitative value, such as a payoff in game theory.
We focused on cooperation based on direct reciprocity (reciprocal altru-
ism) 29). The mechanism is a behavior whereby an individual acts in a manner
that temporarily reduces its fitness, while increasing another individual’s fitness,
with the expectation that the other individual will behave in a similar manner
∗1 http://mobage.com/games/rage-of-bahamut
∗2 http://vcard.ameba.jp
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at a later time. This behavior has been observed in humans10, 11, 20) and other
primates19). In addition, the possibility of this behavior has been suggested
even in vampire bats30) and fishes5). Evolutionary game theory studies have also
shown that reciprocal altruism drives the evolution of cooperation15, 18, 2).
Cooperation based on reciprocal altruism requires the following three
conditions: 1) a long-term social relationship between individuals, 2) the capac-
ity for individual recognition and memory of others’ behavior, and 3) greater
benefits from cooperation than costs of cooperation. If these conditions are sat-
isfied, then an individual can judge whether interactions with another individual
will provide benefits. Thus, cooperators increase their future benefits by cooper-
ating with reciprocal cooperators. Simultaneously, it is difficult for noncoopera-
tors to interact with cooperators, because cooperators tend to select cooperators
as interaction partners12). Consequently, this may work as punishment inhibiting
defective behavior by reciprocal cooperators with noncooperators22).
This study aims to investigate reciprocal altruism that generates coop-
erative behavior in a less restrictive environment. For this purpose, we analyzed
the effects of reciprocal altruism in an SNG, in which players could behave more
freely than was possible in the environments used in the theoretical and experi-
mental studies. Players competed and cooperated with each other in the SNG.
In such an environment, players (i.e., humans) obviously have the capacity for
individual recognition and the memory of others. Therefore, cooperation based
on reciprocal altruism is expected to emerge in an SNG, because the above con-
ditions are met. In this paper, we first confirmed the presence of cooperation
based on reciprocal altruism. Then, we analyzed its effects to determine their
benefits, and explored factors that reinforced cooperative behavior.
§2 Materials and Methods
In this section, we provide the minimal SNG information and the defini-
tion of cooperative behavior in an SNG (see appendices §1, §2, and §3 for game
information, rules, and definition, respectively).
We analyzed cooperative behavior in the SNG, “Girl Friend BETA,” in
which players acquired “event points” and competed in the rankings based on
those points, because the players received better awards as their rankings in-
creased. The player’s ranking order was determined by the sum of event points
obtained in the period from 3/25/2013 to 4/8/2013. It was impossible to analyze
societal dynamics in this SNG, because the rules changed frequently. The situ-
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ation in the SNG was also unstable in the early stage of this period; therefore,
for simplification, we used only the data from the final three days.
The event points for players’ actions correlate significantly with their
levels, one of a player’s attributes∗3. Players must spend their energy to obtain
event points; therefore, the number of players’ actions is finite. There are two
methods for replenishing these points, waiting for the points to replenish over
time and using a paid item. Let “payment amount” be the sum of money spent
by each player during the analysis period. Players must use their resources (items
and time) effectively to progress to a higher ranking, because any player’s time
and money are finite.
Players belong to groups limited to 1-50 players. The SNG is designed
to ensure that cooperation with group members results in an effective game play.
Players can communicate at any time through simple text messaging. This does
not negatively affect either senders or receivers; nevertheless, its positive effects
are also few∗4. We targeted groups of five or more active players who logged in
at least one or more times to analyze social interactions. In addtion, we limited
data to intragroup communication and cooperation.
Table 1 Payoff matrix of leader game, where S + T > 2R and T > S > R > P , i.e.,
Pareto efficiency is achieved, when one cooperates and the other does not cooperate. Then the
cooperator obtains S, and the noncooperator T .
Cooperation Noncooperation
Cooperation R,R S, T
Noncooperation T, S P, P
We analyzed cooperative behavior based on reciprocal altruism in the
above environment. It was difficult to track all cooperative behavior, because
players can exhibit various behaviors in the SNG. Hence, we selected a specific
cooperative behavior among various cooperative behaviors and regarded the fre-
quency of that behavior as a measure of a player’s cooperativeness.
∗3 Accurately, the event points per player’s action depend primarily on players’ attack power,
which strongly correlates with their levels. The game did not store to a log file, hence we
used players’ levels as alternatives.
∗4 Players acquire a few points for a lottery that provides a card, when the players send
messages to other at the beginning of each day. However, players must pay 200 points
for the lottery, and the effect of the card is small, i.e., the points do not increase players’
abilities.
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We focused on a game scenario in which the relationship between players
was similar to that in the Leader game (Table 1), but it was not possible for
both players to cooperate at the same time in this scenario (see appendix §3). In
the Leader game, Pareto efficiency is achieved, when one player cooperates and
the other does not. Then the cooperator receives S, and the noncooperator T .
That is, players receive a high payoff by sharing S and T on repeated plays of
the game, a process known as ST reciprocity28). We recognized this cooperative
behavior, which provides the payoff S to the other, as a cooperative behavior in
this scenario.
§3 Results
First, we confirm the presence of cooperation based on reciprocal altru-
ism. We define the degree of reciprocity between player i and player j for this
analysis as follows:
rij = min(Cij , Cji)/max(Cij , Cji), (1)
where Cij are the number of cooperative behaviors from player i to player j,
Cji are the number of cooperative behaviors from player j to player i, i.e., rij
is asymptotic to one, when they mutually cooperate, and to zero, when one
cooperates with the other and the other does not cooperate in return. rij was
observed, when Cij > 0 or Cji > 0.
0.0
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Fig. 1 Density distribution of degree of reciprocity rij .
Figure 1 shows the density distribution of rij . The mode was 0.0 (i.e.,
nonreciprocal relationship). However, there were also some large values of rij
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Table 2 The results of the regression analysis of event points pi. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate that the
signs of regression coefficients did not change in a Wald-type 99.9%, 99%, and 95% confidence
interval (the symbols show the same meaning in the following figures).
Explanatory Variable Regression Coefficient Standard Error
ln si 0.3481788 (0.0060875)
∗∗∗
Li 0.0275284 (0.0003245)
∗∗∗
fi 0.1523005 (0.0080843)
∗∗∗
Intercept 10.004722 (0.0411644)∗∗∗
(i.e., reciprocal relationship). We regarded this relationships as reciprocal when
rij > 0.0.
Second, we describe the effects of reciprocal relationships in regard to
the benefits. The number of reciprocal relationships fi is expected to affect
the number of event points pi positively, if cooperation based on reciprocity is
effective in the SNG. Consider the following generalized linear model (GLM) to
analyze the effect.
pi ∼ NB(ri), (2)
ln ri = β1 ln si + β2Li + β3fi + β4.
This model is intended to explain the event points pi of player i by player’s level
Li and the number of reciprocal relationships fi. We also use the log of the
payment amount for items si, because paid items proportionally increase the
number of actions intended to obtain event points. NB(x) shows that x follows
a negative binomial distribution. We used a log link function and estimated
its parameters using the maximum likelihood method with 5, 000 players whose
si > 0, sampled at random. In the following analysis, we used the same link func-
tion and the same method of estimating parameters. We considered this model
and a generalized linear mixed-effects model (GLMM) with a Poisson distribu-
tion, because the data showed over-dispersion when the GLM with a Poisson
distribution was applied, then Akaike information criterion (AIC) selected this
model.
Table 2 shows the analysis results of the model. The regression coefficient
of fi was positive, even after controlling for si and Li, i.e., a player with many
reciprocal relationships received more event points than others with the same si
and Li. Thus, reciprocal relationships increased the efficiency of payment, i.e.,
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Table 3 Results of regression analysis for cooperation between players.
Explanatory Variable Regression Coefficient Standard Error
lnC′iCj 0.6210306 (0.0041205)
∗∗∗
Cji 0.0122157 (0.0006525)
∗∗∗
gij −0.0008443 (0.0004852)
gji 0.0021324 (0.0004206)
∗∗∗
Li 0.0004757 (0.0002047)
∗
Lj −0.0019128 (0.0001950)
∗∗∗
mi −0.1066716 (0.0022965)
∗∗∗
Intercept −0.1003971 (0.0283909)∗∗∗
the relationships increased players’ benefits.
Third, we report factors that drove the reciprocal relationships. Con-
sider the following GLMM to analyze the factors:
Cij ∼ Poisson(λij), (3)
lnλij = β1 lnC
′
iCj + β2Cji + β3gij + β4gji
+β5Li + β6Lj + β7mi + β8 + σi.
This model is intended to explain the number of cooperative behaviors from i to
j (Cij) by the number of cooperative behaviors from j to i (Cji), the frequency
of messaging gij and gji, both players’ levels Li and Lj , their group size mi,
and the random effects of their group σi. In addition, we use the log of the
product of C′i and Cj , which respectively shows the total number of cooperative
behaviors of others with i and the total number of cooperative behaviors j with
others, because this value is expected to increase Cij proportionally, if players
cooperate at random. That is, this model estimates the effects of these explana-
tory variables on Cij comparing the random behavior. Poisson(x) shows that x
follows a Poisson distribution. We estimated its parameters with 30, 000 rela-
tionships between players whose C′i, Cj > 0, sampled at random. We considered
this model and a GLM with a negative binomial distribution, because the data
showed over-dispersion when the GLM with a Poisson distribution was applied,
then AIC selected this model.
Table 3 shows the analysis results of the model. The regression coefficient
of Cji and gji were positive, even after controlling for Cj , C
′
i, Li and Lj , i.e., to
receive cooperation from others, it was important for players to cooperate with
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each other and to receive communications from others. In addition, this trend
was stronger with smaller groups, because mi was negative.
Finally, we analyzed the effects of players’ social relationships on their
social behavior in win-win situations, in which responding to a “help” request
from group members provides benefits to both the helper and the helped players
(see appendix §4). Then, the helper can obtain benefits even by helping someone.
We estimated the social relationships effect on whether a player who receives a
help request responds to the request. Consider the following GLM to analyze
the effect of reciprocal relationships:
Hij ∼ NB(rij), (4)
ln rij = β1 lnH
′
iHj + β2Cji + β3gij + β4gji
+β5Li + β6Lj + β7mi + β8.
This model is intended to explain the number of help requests from i to j (Hij)
by the number of help requests from j to i (Hji), the frequency of messaging
gij and gji, both players’ levels Li and Lj, and their group size mi. In addition,
we used the log of the product of H ′i and Hj , which respectively shows the total
number of help requests from others to i and from j to others, because this value
is expected to increase Hij proportionally, if players respond to help requests at
random. That is, this model estimates the effects of these explanatory variables
on Hij comparing the random behavior. NB(x) shows that x follows a negative
binomial distribution. We estimated its parameters using 30, 000 relationships
between players who satisfied H ′i, Hj > 0, sampled at random. We considerd
this model and a GLMM with a Poisson distribution, because the data showed
over-dispersion when the GLM with a Poisson distribution was applied, then
AIC selected this model.
Table 4 shows the analysis results of the model. The regression coefficient
of Cji, gij and gji were positive, even after controlling for Hj , H
′
i, Li and Lj ,
i.e., in order to get helps from others, it was important to cooperate with each
other and to communicate each other. Additionally, this trend was stronger in
smaller groups because mi was negative. Thus, players selected partners who
were cooperative for them even in the win–win situation.
§4 Discussion
In the present study, we analyzed social behavior in the SNG to un-
derstand reciprocal altruism, one of the mechanisms that generate cooperative
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Table 4 Results of the regression analysis for response to help requests.
Explanatory Variable Regression Coefficient Standard Error
lnH ′iHj 0.8891775 (0.0064618)
∗∗∗
Cji 0.0066710 (0.0018601)
∗∗∗
gij 0.0089753 (0.0007516)
∗∗∗
gji 0.0066472 (0.0007328)
∗∗∗
Li 0.0063142 (0.0002365)
∗∗∗
Lj −0.0046951 (0.0002432)
∗∗∗
mi −0.0692416 (0.0012895)
∗∗∗
Intercept −0.4414666 (0.0218464)∗∗∗
behavior. We showed the presence of reciprocal relationships with players who
had reciprocal relationships receiving more benefits than others. That is, this
SNG could be used to explore the mechanism of the emergence of reciprocal
altruism.
Our analysis showed that cooperation and communication were impor-
tant in creating reciprocal relationships. Cooperation was a signal representing
cooperativeness (i.e., “I’m a cooperator”) 1). A player needed to cooperate to
send a signal. Consequently, players paid the cost of signaling, thereby providing
benefits to receivers. The signal is expected to be highly reliable, because the
meaning of the signal depends strongly on the sending method (cooperation) 23).
Conversely, communication in simple text messages∗5 was not guaranteed to be
reliable as a signal, because signaling cost was not incurred, and it provided lit-
tle benefit to receivers, i.e., with such a low-cost signal, senders could lie at any
time23). Interestingly, low-cost signals not guaranteed to be reliable emerged,
along with reliable signals.
Human social grooming is one of the low-cost signals. Social grooming is
the construction and maintenance of social relationships in a complex society13).
Apes groom each other as their social grooming16). However, this is too costly
for humans, because human group size is larger than ape group size; there-
fore, humans must invest time and effort in grooming others to create social
relationships in large groups7). Therefore low-cost social grooming (e.g., gaze
grooming14)) and one-to-many grooming (e.g., gossip8)) would be expected to
∗5 Players tended to convey enthusiasm, acknowledgement, and encouragement.
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have evolved in humans. In the SNG too, low-cost signals (“messaging”) might
be used to create social relationships between players, even though a reliable
signal was used.
Similarly, as the above reciprocal behavior, players more frequently
tended to respond to requests from cooperative players with them than to those
from noncooperative players, even in a win-win situation, in which responding to
a “help” request from others provides benefits to both the helper and the helped
players. That is, cooperators acquired benefits for interacting with each other
in such a situation. Conversely, noncooperators did not, because their “help”
requests were received a lower priority than the cooperators’ requests. Conse-
quently, the cooperators acquired greater benefits than the noncooperators. We
can regard the effect of such cooperators’ behavior tendencies as punishment20)
for noncooperators that may have decreased noncooperative behavior.
The present study provides quantitative evidence that the three mecha-
nisms, reciprocal altruism, social grooming, and punishment, generate coopera-
tion in an environment in which players can behave with fewer restrictions than
in the theoretical and experimental studies. In addition, this trend was stronger
in smaller groups.
We regarded the social environment of the SNG as static for simplifica-
tion. However, in reality, new players come to this game every day, some players
stop playing, and new social relationships are constructed. Simultaneously, the
strength and kinds of social dilemmas change dynamically. Therefore, analysis
of the dynamics of social relationships is a challenge for future research.
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§1 Game Information
We analyzed cooperative behavior in the SNG, “Girl Friend BETA.”
Table 5 presents the game information.
In this SNG, players create individual decks of cards that they collect and
then use their decks to perform tasks in the SNG. A powerful deck, constructed
from powerful cards, provides an advantage for game play in various situations.
The players’ primary motivation in the SNG is to obtain powerful cards. Players
can obtain powerful cards as top-ranking rewards (see details later) or by casting
lots called “Gacha.”
Players belong to groups in which they cooperate with each other to
play the game efficiently; the groups were limited to 1-50 players. We filtered
out players who do not belong to groups, because almost all active players be-
longed to groups to play effectively. Active players can create groups on their
own. Others apply to join groups and then join a group after acceptance of
the application by an administrator, who is typically a group founder. Play-
ers can leave a group at any time and apply to join a different group. Players
observe their group members’ behavior (e.g., attack on common enemies (see de-
tails later)), because the game system shows their behavior on the game screen.
Thus, the SNG meets conditions 1 and 2 for reciprocity.
This game system provides two communication methods, “messaging”
between two players and posting on a “bulletin board,” which is provided for
each group. We analyzed “messaging,” because it was used more often than the
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Table 5 Game information
Developer and Publisher CyberAgent Inc.
Service Name Girl Friend BETA
URL http://vcard.ameba.jp
Event Name Cherry Blossom Viewing Party
Event Type Raid Battle
Event Time Period 3/25/2013 16:00 to 4/8/2013 14:00
Analysis Time Period 4/5/2013 0:00 to 4/8/2013 14:00
“bulletin board.” Players use this function to send simple messages limited to
30 Japanese characters. It does not affect either senders or receivers negatively;
nevertheless, its positive effects are also few. Every player can read messages of
all other players on the respective receiver’s profile page at any time. It is used
primarily one to one, but players can also send a message concurrently to their
group members or to players who have joined a battle with them (see details
later).
§2 Game Rules
Our analysis target was a raid event (Fig. 2), in which players attack
large enemies∗6 and acquire “event points.” Players competed in the rankings
based on their event points, because they received better awards as their rankings
increased.
Players conduct quests∗7 to find enemies during an event. Players begin
battles when they find an enemy and then attack the enemy to obtain points.
However, enemies with very high hit points are strong, making it difficult for
players to win these battles unaided. Thus, they can call for help from other
group members, to win the battle. Players who helped had their point gain
increased by 1.5 times. Therefore, players help their fellow group members to
acquire more points.
Players’ point gains are proportional to the amount of damage caused
during attacks, i.e., more powerful decks earn more event points. A player
∗6 The enemy only has hit points as an attribute, meaning that players cannot be attacked
by enemies. A player must attack an enemy to acquire event points at the expense of
attack points.
∗7 This is one of the basic actions in SNGs. A player may encounter an enemy on performing
certain action.
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1. Quest 
Player 
Their point gain increase by 1.5 times  
5. Ranking 
Group members 
2. Find an Enemy→ Battle Start 
3. Call for help 
4. Attack 
No. 1: Mark（12040pt） 
No. 2: Smith（11010pt） 
No. 3: Emily（11005pt） 
No. 4: Ken（9015pt） 
Fig. 2 Overview of raid event. A player conducts “quests” to find enemies (1). The player
begins a battle upon finding an enemy and then attacks the enemy to obtain points (2).
Enemies with very high hit points are strong; thus, they can call for help from other group
members whom they have helped to win the battle (3). Players who helped had their point
gain increased by 1.5 times (4). Players compete in rankings based on their points (5).
immediately acquires points upon attacking an enemy, even if the enemy is not
defeated. However, a player cannot battle another enemy while already battling
another enemy, and that enemies’ hit points increase with each battle; therefore,
players must attack enemies repeatedly in the latter half of an event. Thus,
a player who finds an enemy or helps a fellow group member must defeat the
enemy before taking a next action, or wait until that the enemy leaves∗8.
Players increase the amount of damage caused during their attacks by
launching “combo attacks,” alternate attacks by two or more players in which
the players need to launch attacks within ten minutes after other players∗9. The
longer a chain of combo attacks, the more acquisition points are acquired. Bat-
tling enemies together with fellow group members increases the effectiveness of
acquisition points.
Players must use a quarter of their attack points to attack; thus, they
can attack four times when their point totals are full. There are two methods
for replenishing these points: wait for the points to replenish over time or use
an item that costs 100 JPY (such items are also sometimes distributed in the
game as rewards).
∗8 The length of the disable time is set between one and two hours. It is too long to complete
the rankings for middle- and higher-rank players, because other players progress in the
rankings during their disabled time.
∗9 If a player sequentially attacks an enemy then the attack is not count for the “combo
attacks.” In addition, if players do not attack during ten minutes then their chain of
combo attacks are reset to 0.
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Table 6 Payoff matrix for the test scenario consisting of two players and an enemy with very
few hit points. The player who attacks the enemy receives S, and the other player receives T .
If neither player attacks the enemy, then each receives P . Attack by both players is impossible,
because either player can defeat the enemy.
Attack Wait
Attack -, - S, T
Wait T, S P, P
Thus, players must use their resources (items and time) effectively to
progress to a higher ranking, e.g., responding to a “help” request from their
group members to acquire a point gain increase of 1.5 times, increasing the
number of “combo attacks” to increase the amount of damage, and reducing the
disable time. We defined payment efficiency as the event points per payment, as
in game theory.
§3 The Test Scenario
It was impossible to track every cooperative behavior, because play-
ers can exhibit various behaviors in the SNG. Hence, we focused on one easily
tracked cooperative behavior, and we regarded its frequency as players’ cooper-
ativeness.
We focused on the following scenario based on these rules to define play-
ers’ cooperativeness.
• An enemy is attacked by a player and fellow group members.
• The enemy’s hit points are very few.
In this scenario, players who defeat the enemy will acquire only a few
event points, because their attack power is higher than the enemy’s hit points.
Thus, their behavior is not efficient for acquiring event points. By contrast, if
the players’ attack power is lower than the enemy’s hit points, their behavior
is efficient for acquiring event points. Furthermore, they cannot battle another
enemy, if battle with one enemy is ongoing, and therefore must wait until they
defeat the enemy to exhibit efficient behavior.
In simple terms, consider that two players battled an enemy in this
scenario, where their relationship is represented in Table 6. The relationship
between the variables is T > S > P in this payoff matrix. Attack is not efficient,
when S is less than T . However, if they do not attack the enemy, they waste
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time by waiting for someone else to attack, i.e., P is lowest. It is not possible to
cooperate both players in this scenario, because an attack on the enemy by either
player immediately defeats the enemy. The values of this payoff matrix depend
on each players situation, e.g., the differences between the two attack powers∗10.
This asymmetric diversity satisfies condition 3 for reciprocity. In the scenario,
both try to avoid the worst situation (i.e., they get P ), but they also do not
want to pay the cost to avoid the worst situation (i.e., they get S). This social
dilemma is similar to the one in the “Leader game” (Table 1). In that game,
Pareto efficiency is achieved when one cooperates, and the other does not. Then,
the cooperator receives S, and the noncooperator T . That is, players receive a
high payoff by sharing S and T on repeated plays of the game, a process known
as ST reciprocity28). We recognized this cooperative behavior, which provided
the payoff S from one to the other, as a cooperative behavior in this scenario.
Cooperative behavior is an inefficient attack, as shown in Table 6; thus
we define aij as the attack efficiency indicator:
aij = eij/M(ei), (5)
where eij are the event points in player i’s jth attack and M(ei) is the median
of ei = {ei1, · · · , eiN} (N is the frequency of player i’s attacks). We considered
cooperative behavior to be in the range of a ≤ 0.40.
§4 The Test Scenario without Social Dilemma
We analyzed social behavior in a win-win situation in which players do
not have a social dilemma, i.e., an enemy’s hit point remains sufficient. It is
difficult for players to defeat the enemy alone in this situation. Therefore, they
request “help” from their group members. If the group members respond to the
request, then the helper and the helped players effectively acquire event points
by creating a chain of combo attacks. In addition, the group members also have
their point gain increased by 1.5 times. Thus, responding to a “help” request
from group members provides benefits to helpers, irrespective of the one they
help.
∗10 In addition, it does not mean that the relationship between the payoffs is constant. If a
player is about to go to sleep, then S is larger than T , because the attack points replenish
the next morning.
